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Foreword: The Asian Financial Contagion-
A Global Epidemic
JOHN B. ATTANASIO*
This conference was my very first proposal as Dean of the SMU Law School. It was
based on the prominence that the law school enjoys among faculty and alumni in Asia, and
the tremendous expertise they have in law and finance. The trailblazer was the great Dean
Robert Storey. These traditions are carried forward today by an exceptional, global faculty.
Among the most talented is my partner in this endeavor, the Director of our Banking Law
Center, Joe Norton.
The initial focus of this conference was the Asian Financial Crisis, but unfortunately, the
conference grew as the crisis expanded. In August 1998, the contagion spread to Russia;
somewhat before that, it hit South Africa. Brazil and other countries in South America then
caught the disease to the point that Brazilian financial markets were at times dysfunctional.
Equador has experienced political unrest. The crisis spread to the United States in August
1998 and the stock market plunged in a relatively short period of time. In response, the
Federal Reserve took quick action to reduce interest rates several different times and the
stock market shot up. The Dow Jones average even broke the magical 10,000 barrier and
briefly exceeded 11,000.
Whether that most recent vertical rise represents a utopian economy in which cycles are
a thing of the past or whether we have a bubble, as many economists fear, remains to be
seen. Mr. Greenspan was worried when the Dow reached the 6,000 to 7,000 level. Accord-
ing to the Financial Times, the stock market has risen ninefold since 1982, yet only one-
third of this rise is attributable to rising profits with the rest coming from increases in price-
earnings ratios.' Another measure that the Fed tracks is the forward price-earnings ratio
on the S&P 500 compared to the ten-year treasury bond yield.2 By this measure the stock
market was overvalued by twenty-seven percent last March, a level that has been reached
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only two other times.' When the Dow passed 10,000, the price-earning ratio was thirty-
four to one.
4
The Financial Times also reports corporate debt incursions of $359 billion to repurchase
stock or to engage in merger activity.5 If a bubble exists, it could present big problems if
we are unable to grow out of it before it bursts. Even if a bubble does not exist, former
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin stated that the United States cannot continue to function
as the only engine sustaining world growth as this has caused a serious balance of payments
problem, which we cannot sustain indefinitely.6 During what became the global financial
crisis, the American economy served as the bulwark holding up the world economy.7
The crisis even traveled to Europe with the German, Italian, and English economies
suffering. For example, during the last part of 1998, the German economy contracted by
about 0.4 percent.' Such a contraction presented a particularly difficult problem for Ger-
many as unemployment has hovered at ten percent or above for some time.9 However,
conditions now seem to be improving. The Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung, one of Ger-
many's leading economic institutes, predicts the German economy will have grown 1.7
percent in 1999 and foresees 2.5 percent growth next year, which is above the expectations
of the German Finance Ministry.'0 French officials expect economic growth this year be-
tween 2.3 and 2.5 percent." Overall expectations for the Euro-zone economies has im-
proved over the course of this year.2
For some time, the Chinese economy has been weakening. China played a very construc-
tive role throughout the crisis by refusing to devalue the RMB. 13 A devaluation of the RMB
would have set off another chain reaction of devaluations in Asia, which would have stunted
the nascent recoveries in such economies as Korea and Thailand. An RMB devaluation may
also have thrown the Asian economies back into chaos and perhaps meltdown.
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China has suffered from its failure to devalue the RMB. Its GDP growth has slipped
from 8.3 percent at the end of the first quarter of 1999 to 6.9 percent at the close of the
second quarter. Some think that the Chinese economy is now hardly growing at all. 15 My
friends in China tell me that because of population growth, the Chinese need five percent
annual growth just to stay even with employment. Chinese exports have declined by 4.6
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percent in the first half of the year,1 6 while imports have surged by 16.6 percent. Conse-
quently, the Chinese trade surplus will decline very substantially this year.'7 At least the
recent interviews of Premier Zhu indicate that China will refrain from devaluing for the
present. The Chinese population is feeling the pain of the crisis. This pain is exacerbated
by layoffs connected with the downsizing of state enterprises, a phenomenon that preceded
the crisis.'" The crisis may have rendered these moves more urgent, however, as it may have
increased the losses that these highly inefficient state enterprises were already experienc-
ing.19 The Chinese government is saying that these harsh economic conditions have sparked
civil unrest.
The growth rate of the Asian economy slipped from 6.5 percent in 1997 to 1.8 percent
in 1998; however, some project a rise to some 3.5 percent in 1999.20 This predicted growth
rate includes twenty-one Asian developing countries, but excludes Japan.2' The Asian crisis
is still felt in the dominant economy of Japan, which grew by a meager 0.2 percent between
April and June, beating consensus projections of a marginal decline." The government
hopes to continue this growth by recently announcing 500 billion yen ($4.63 billion) in
new spending.23 This stimulus package comes on the heels of a disappointingly modest 0.8
percent growth in personal consumption, a widely used indicator of Japan's recovery.
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Irrespective of short-run results, the insolvency problem with the banks is so large that
some think that it will take a long time to fix the Japanese economy.2"
On a more optimistic note, we have seen good rallies in the Korean, Japanese, Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Thai stock markets, which may indicate that investors are feeling a
sense of relief that we have turned the corner.26 Korea is expected to grow between five
percent and six percent this year, in contrast to its 5.8 percent contraction in 1998.27 Korea
has problems with structural reform of its chaebols. Stanley Fischer, Robert Rubin, and
Lawrence Summers have expressed doubt about the amount of reform that has actually
taken place in Korea.28 Slow growth in middle-class and lower-class spending has resulted
from fears of unemployment.29 Unemployment fell in May to 6.4 percent, from its peak of
7.9 percent last December.3" Thailand is now fashioning an economic stimulus package of
$3 billion to ease the credit crunch that has undermined its banking system. 3"
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Many remain pessimistic or at least cautious because businesses have not restructured in
many of these countries, and we may not have seen the worst of the bad loan problem. For
example, nonperforming loans have hit sixty to seventy percent in the Indonesian state
banking sector.3" Recently, Indonesia merged four failing state-owned banks into the largest
bank in Indonesia. However, fifty-five to sixty percent of these banks' loans were classified
as having no hope of repayment." The Japanese Diet has recently appropriated $67 billion
to bail out its banks from the problem of bad loans.34 However, Japan's financial institutions
had amassed $720 billion in problem loans as of March 31, 1999.11 Thai banks' nonper-
forming loans growth has decelerated, but the peak will not be reached until the second
half of the year.3
6
I have already mentioned Equador and the leaders' claims of unrest in China. Indonesia,
the fourth biggest population in the world, has experienced considerable unrest. But the
big black hole as far as unrest goes is Russia. Russia has descended into an abyss from which
few people think that it will soon climb out. The hole was not dug by the crisis, but the
crisis may be filling in the grave. Before the crisis, the Russian economy and stock market
were rallying and the Russian economy appeared to be pulling out of the doldrums that
have afflicted it for much of this decade. However, the slowdown produced by the contagion
effected a sharp drop in oil prices, which sent the Russian economy into free fall last Au-
gust.
37
An overlooked factor in the Russian chaos is the liquidity crunch that the crisis imposed
on lending institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. These bodies may have been
more willing to overlook some of Russia's foibles and outright shenanigans while world
economic growth soared and conditions remained good. Massive bailout packages sent to
Korea and Thailand imposed enormous pressures on liquidity rendering bailouts of Russia
more difficult. Simultaneously, the creditworthiness of Russia plunged along with the price
of its major asset, oil.31 In the wake of the Russian stock market collapse, the center lost
power so that some commentators now consider it a "failed state. '39 What does one do with
a failed state that has at least 6,000 long-range nuclear warheads?
Since I lived in Russia in 1990, the ruble has declined from an official rate of six to $1
and a reported black market rate of sixteen to thirty to $1, to between 25,000 or 26,000 to
$1;40 really it is a failed currency as often barter and dollars are used for exchange. Even
before the crisis, life expectancy for Russian males declined from sixty-two to fifty-eight
since 1980-ten years less than in China.41 The Russian economy has shown some im-
provement with oil prices having doubled this year,42 but the increase has not restored the
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value of the ruble. Tellingly, the ruble has not regained the three-fourths of its value lost
since last August.
One little-known consequence of the crisis that may spawn unrest stems from its dis-
tributive effects. The following chart is taken from a recent issue of the Internationa/Herald
Tribune, which took it from the New York Times.41
It shows how miuch value so many of the world's stock markets lost during the crisis, and,
in turn, the sums that some of the world's stock-those in Europe and the United States
-gained. Inevitably, as markets collapsed around the world, investors sought safe havens
in countries such as the United States and Germany. With time, however, gratitude for the
"miracle" economy that saved the world may fade as people realize these redistributive
effects.4 4
People's anger may be fueled by stories that the Clinton administration's strong policies
of free capital flow may have helped to precipitate the crisis by unduly exposing small
economies to the predatory behavior of currency speculators. 45 Some former members of
the Clinton administration admit this connection. In 1996, $93 billion flowed into In-donesia, Korea, Thailand, Philippines, and Malaysia. In 1997, $12 billion flowed out. 47 A
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French scholar, Charles Wyplosz, argues that "financial market liberalization is the best
predictor of a currency crisis."48 The American Congress may get some blame too for
balking on its IMF obligations at a crucial point in the crisis. 49 Widespread reports have
emerged of Western businesspersons journeying to Asia to purchase cash-strapped Asian
businesses for fractions of their actual worth.5"
One also cannot help but compare the response to the European and American crises
with the medicine that we prescribed for our Asian, African, and South American brothers.
To solve their problems, the large economies forced these others to tighten their belts by
restructuring, allowing their currencies to float, and shooting interest rates up-which just
about everyone thinks was a big mistake.5' When the crisis hit the United States and Europe,
we immediately sent interest rates rocketing down. Interestingly, so now hasJapan. A cynical
view of this contrast would have it that the large, economically powerful states can cut their
economies some slack when they experience problems, while smaller economies that are
dependent on these big economies do not have such options available.
Another expression of resentment focuses on the growing incursions on sovereignty that
many international traders, investment banking and brokerage houses have effectively im-
posed. How long will less powerful countries tolerate such incursions, and how much will
resentment grow? Resentment is growing in the United States, too, relating to jobs and
free trade. The United States and Europe have had trade skirmishes over bananas, hormone
fed beef, and other products.52 Under pressure from the Asian financial crisis, the U.S. trade
deficit has ballooned, and one response has been some protectionist tendencies emerging
in Congress, notably in the steel area.5" Of course, trade barriers helped to ignite the Great
Depression.
Ironically, the large capital flows into Germany, the United States and other countries
may be inflating a stock market bubble that worried Alan Greenspan and many other econ-
omists even before the crisis, when the stock market was at 6000.14 But many insist that
such alarmist thinking is based on antiquated notions of economic cycles. Asia may well
tell the story of what problems not believing in cycles can cause. The funny thing about
cycles is that they follow the laws of physics: what goes up a lot very fast, generally comes
down a lot very fast. One of the most frightening statements I have heard in the last few
months by a CEO of an American subsidiary of a Japanese company was that the United
States looks like Japan did ten years ago.
So how did this mess happen? That is for our distinguished conferees to say, but I cannot
resist speculating. The computer driven, high-expectations, unregulated world economy is
now geared like a high strung, finely tuned, high performance car. When everything is
right, it really hums; however, it is very temperamental. All is premised on rapid continuous
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high growth, which puts a lot of pressure on the system. If anything goes wrong, break-
downs occur. As with a high performance car, breakdowns can be substantial and costly to
fix.
But what do I know? People who give introductions are only responsible for provoking
thought. They are also responsible for thanking people, and I have many to thank. I want
to thank the Lee Trust for being the principal sponsor of the conference. I would also like
to thank H.D. Vest Financial Services for their substantial support of the conference. The
chairman of the SMU Law School's Executive Board, Alan Feld, secured a number of our
illustrious speakers. Joe Norton-one of the most distinguished banking lawyers in the
world-was my partner in crime in this endeavor. Joe also organized a number of satellite
conferences in London, Bangkok, Johannesburg, Stockholm, Hong Kong, and Cologne,
which have tracked the crisis around the world. SMU Law School joined with some of the
finest institutions around the world to present these conferences-the Universities of Lon-
don, Wittwatersand, Cologne, Thamasaat, and Hong Kong.
The London conference on the Russian crisis took place in late May and featured the
general counsels of the IMF and the European Central Bank. The Hong Kong conference
featured the chairman of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission and the Dean
of the Faculty of Law at Hong Kong University. The Dallas conference featured the former
General Counsel of the U.S. Treasury, the Senior Economist of the Bank of China in the
United States, and the former Japanese Ambassador to the United Nations. Our own dis-
tinguished alumnus Dr. Helmut Sohmen began the conference with the Center of Pacific
Rim Studies lecture on the critical importance of controlling corruption. A distinguished
group of lawyers, economists, financiers, bankers, CEOs, and others graced this conference.
Among the notables were the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Dallas Fed, Dr.
Robert D. McTeer, Jr., and the Vice-Chairman of Goldman Sachs, Robert Hormats. Others
followed after the conference, including Senator Phil Gramm. The interdisciplinary nature
of the conference enhanced the discourse. Partners on Campus included the Economics
Department and the John G. Tower Center for Political Science, and within the law school,
the Center for Pacific Rim Studies and the Banking Institute.
Finally, I want to thank Associate Dean Christine Szaj, my wife Kathy, and Rebekah Bell
for their exceptional work in organizing the Dallas conference. I hope that the written
materials that emerge from this global enterprise shed some light on these developments
so that people will not have to suffer through them again soon.
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